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Las Barras Bravas - the Mafia and Football Ultras in Convergence

The label "barra brava" originated in the 1970s and was attached to various football supporter groups in the Americas. It is unclear when such fan organisations began to emerge; however, by the 1980s they 'began to characterise themselves by violence,' according to Argentine sociologist José Garriga. . While these groups are, at their core, fan clubs, in many ways this is only a superficial appearance. . Indeed, some have even called into question whether they are fan clubs at all or whether that is only a mask. . According to Monica Nizzardo, founder of Salvemos el fútbol (let's save football), 'the barra brava is a mercenary who does not want to watch the game... he is only attentive to the business that revolves around it.'.

 

 

In reality, these groups hold significant power within the management structure of their respective football clubs and frequently engage in illicit markets (often drug trafficking). These organisations don't fall neatly into any of the traditional types of organised crime groups (i.e., mafia, cartels, etc.). Insight Crime describes "las barras bravas" as 'fan-run gangs,' and their profit streams are very complex.

 

 

Simply put, these organisations, when not supporting their teams, work to maximise profits, and the avenues used to do this vary from extortion to profiting off money spent at the football stadiums to the drug trade. It is often the violent outbreaks that make media headlines; yet, in many ways, their violence masks the true criminal activity they engage in. Gustavo Grabia, an Argentinian journalist who specialises in the investigation of corruption in football, suggested that 'the biggest barras also receive up to 30% of transfer fees when a player leaves and up to 20% of some players' paychecks.' Many of "las barras bravas" use the football matches as opportunities to sell drugs (as well as use them themselves, which often results in violence). However, their presence isn't restricted to within football stadiums; in 2018, 15 people, linked to "las barras bravas," were arrested by the Argentinian authorities on suspicion of importing drugs from Colombia and distributing them in Buenos Aires. Another large avenue stream for these groups on match days is by forcing fans to pay them in order to be able to park their cars. According to Gustavo Grabia, La 12 (an Argentinian "barra brava" associated with the football club Boca Juniors) makes up to '$1,000,000 each game day' with this form of extortion.

 

 

In Catino's 2019 paper, he speaks of 'organisational dilemmas' within organised crime groups and 'pairs of opposites.' These ‘opposites’ can help to understand the functioning of these groups. One of the 'dilemmas' presented is the idea of 'decentralisation' vs. 'centralisation,' and in the case of "las barras bravas," they tend to follow the structure of the latter. These groups tend to favour a clear hierarchy to aid in decision-making. This hierarchy includes a clear boss of each gang who coordinates decision-making, much like the typical mafia structure. However, most members of these groups are young people who come from households with low economic income and seek social identity.

 

 

Two more of Catino's 'dilemmas' are between visibility and concealment and violence and containment. "Las barras bravas" use visibility and, in fact, use the stadiums to exhibit this visibility. Their choice of violence and their strategy of visibility are inextricably linked and represent their lack of concern for state intervention and their desire to signal authority. According to the NGO, 305 people have been killed in Argentina alone under football violence. Violence is key to understanding how these groups function. While, of course, much of the violence is fuelled by the use of drugs and alcohol, it is often used more tactically and can take place away from the stadiums. There are often mafia-style shootings and executions between different "barras bravas" to fight for control.

 

 

However, the violence is so normalised that it even takes place within specific "barras bravas." For example, in 2013, Diego Ochoa, leader of the group affiliated with Newell's Old Boys in Argentina, was arrested by the local police for his involvement in two murders; one of the victims was the ex-leader of the very same “barra brava.” Violence is not only praised but expected in these groups and is one of the key methods to help prove your loyalty and rise higher within the gangs. Most of the violence is concentrated in and around the stadiums, naturally. However, it would be naïve to generalise this violence as all the same, only due to its geographical location. . Archetti and Romero present three frameworks to understanding this violence: the first is the violence 'linked to political repression'; the second is 'violence between rival fans'; and the third is the violence 'linked to political persecution.'. Further research proposed other genres of violence, such as 'killings within the same stand of the fan group.'.

 

 

These groups are hugely corrupt, and this is arguably the largest factor in their ability to hold so much power. Indeed, in 2015, Carlos de los Santos, an officer in Argentina's Security Unit for Live Events, stated that corruption is endemic in Argentina, and it is what has allowed the Barras to get so powerful. He suggested that to break the barras, you have to sever their political connection and root out those police complicit in their activities. Insight Crime writes that 'political and law enforcement links allow barras bravas near total impunity for their crimes, aided by the general inefficiency of the Argentine justice system.' The state has taken steps to reduce overall violence, such as Argentina banning 'away fans from attending football matches after the death of a supporter' in 2013, and has arrested key bosses of "barras bravas" in the past (such as in the case of Diego Ochoa); however, no serious progress has yet been made.

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